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A Dynamic Look at Subprime Loan
Performance
Michelle A. Danis
Securities and Exchange Commission
Washington, DC

Anthony Pennington-Cross
The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Research Division
St. Louis, MO

Mortgage performance is typically studied in terms of the
probability or frequency of default and prepayment, a static
characterization that does not consider the behavior of a loan before it
terminates. Before termination, a loan can be either current or
delinquent. A delinquency can last for only a short period of time or for
a very long time.
Understanding the dynamic link between delinquency and loan
termination is important for several reasons. For example, the
delinquency behavior of loans can impact the payment streams of
securities with underlying mortgage collateral. In addition, regulators,
lenders, and other secondary market participants can benefit from
understanding the risk of termination associated with delinquent
mortgages.
High-risk subprime mortgages provide an ideal laboratory for
studying the dynamic nature of mortgage performance because these
loans tend to default and terminate at high rates (see Alexander et al.
[2002], Pennington-Cross [2003], Cowan and Cowan [2004], and
Capozza and Thomson [2005]). Subprime lending tends to be
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concentrated in low-income and minority areas and in areas with
troubled economic conditions. Subprime borrowers also tend to have
poor credit characteristics, be less knowledgeable about the mortgage
process, and be less satisfied with their mortgages. These are
characteristics generally found to be consistent with trouble in meeting
financial commitments (Pennington-Cross [2002], Calem, Cillen, and
Wachter [2004], and Courchane, Surette, and Zorn [2004]).
We examine the implications of delinquency for the performance
of subprime mortgages. That is, does delinquency have any predictive
power for the future performance of a mortgage? In addition, while it
seems intuitively obvious that delinquency naturally leads to default,
we also examine whether delinquency increases or reduces the
probability that a loan will terminate through prepayment. We find
evidence suggesting that when a loan is delinquent over a long period
of time, prepayments dominate defaults as the primary termination.

I. Motivation and Literature Review
We examine the history of a loan until it defaults, which we
define as entering foreclosure proceedings or becoming real estate
owned by the lender, or until the loan is terminated through
prepayment. Exhibit 1 provides a conceptual overview of the dynamic
relationship between delinquency and the final outcome or termination
of the loan.1
In each month that a loan is alive or still active, it can be either
current or delinquent. Loans can terminate at any time, but can
default only after being delinquent; yet delinquency can lead to any
other state (current, default, or prepayment). In addition, prepaid
loans can be delinquent or current in the previous month.2
Delinquency does play an important part in the path a loan
takes to termination. Since a loan must necessarily be delinquent
before default, it may seem obvious that delinquent loans must be
more likely to default. Mitigating factors can retard the transition from
delinquency to default, though, the most important being prepayment
of the mortgage.
A rational borrower may attempt to avoid the costs of
foreclosure, which can be substantial and include legal fees besides a
negative credit report. Negative credit reports can impact the cost of
credit in the future. One way to avoid these costs is to sell the
property and thus prepay the mortgage. Lenders too have incentives
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to avoid foreclosure costs through workout arrangements with
delinquent borrowers. Many of these workouts, such as short
refinances, result in prepayment of the mortgage.3
An important element to consider is that default and
prepayment are competing risks. Increases in the probability of
prepayment must necessarily lead to reduction in either the probability
of continuing the mortgage or the probability of default.
The economic motives behind prepayments in the case of a
seriously delinquent mortgage are distinct from the traditional motives
tor prepayment. Customary drivers of prepayments include drops in
interest rates and trigger events such as job loss or divorce.
Prepayments of delinquent mortgages, however, can be viewed as
distressed prepayments brought about by borrower or lender desire to
avoid a default.
The current equity status of the property is a key determinant of
whether a delinquent mortgage will prepay or will default. From the
borrower's perspective, a positive equity position makes the borrower
more likely to attempt to preserve such a position by selling rather
than letting the property go into foreclosure. From the lenders
perspective, the opposite is true in the case of a property with positive
equity. If the borrower does not want to sell the house, the least costly
alternative may be to foreclose, sell, and use the proceeds to satisfy
the debt. The net impact of current equity on defaults and
prepayments is thus an open empirical question.
There is no reason to assume that the relationship between
delinquency and default is linear. For example, Ambrose, Buttimer,
and Capone [1997] identify three benefits to delinquency, namely, free
rent, income smoothing, and time to cure or the value of delay.
Free rent is received during delinquency because the mortgage
is not being paid in a timely Hishion. Borrowers can also not pay their
mortgages in an attempt to maintain a standard of living beyond
current income streams. This may make most sense for those with
highly variable income sources or anticipated permanent increases in
income in the near future. Lastly, delinquency by its nature entails a
period of delay, and delaying can be valuable because it can buy time
to solve the problem. House prices may rise dramatically or the
borrower may solve the liquidity problem through a change in job
status, seasonal income streams, or improved credit availability. Kau
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and Kim [1994] discuss the value of delay and the role of house price
volatility in an options theory framework.
Borrowers face significant costs while being delinquent. Late
fees accrue over time, making it cost more in the long run to cure the
loan. In addition, the delinquency is reported to credit agencies, which
can have long-term and dramatic impacts on a household. The cost of
credit will increase; the availability of credit will lessen; and new
positions may be threatened due to credit and background checks.
There are significant costs to default that could make prepayment a
more attractive option.
Given that delinquency can precede almost any outcome, it is an
empirical question as to whether it leads to more defaults,
prepayments, or just more delinquency. To examine the influence of
delinquency on the future performance of a mortgage, we need to
understand the forces that influence the probability a loan will be
delinquent and the intensity of the delinquency. Empirical research
over the last 30 years has addressed many of the same drivers.
For example, von Furstenberg and Green [1974] and Morton
[1975] find that the loan to value (LTV) ratio at origination and the
income of the borrower play important roles in mortgage delinquency.
Getter [2003] complements these findings by using the 1998 Survey
of Consumer Finances to show that borrowers use other non-housing
financial assets to help make payments during unexpected periods of
financial stress. Chinloy [1995] finds in the United Kingdom during the
period 1983 through 1992 that LTV and income are the primary
covariates associated with delinquency. Other researchers also find
that credit scores, contemporaneous economic conditions, and the
incentive structure of the lender all can impact delinquency (Baku and
Smith [1998), Caleni and Wachter [1999], Ambrose and Capone
[2000].4
Ambrose and Capone [1996, 2000] have shown empirically that
the behavior of a loan in the past can help to predict its behavior in
the future. They find that the length of the first serious delinquency
(defined as time spent 90 or more days delinquent) reduces the
probability of a second period of serious delinquency (90 days- plus
delinquent). In addition, if the loan enters serious delinquency tor a
second time, it is less likely to be reinstated. These results provide
empirical evidence that die current status of a mortgage is not
independent of its status in previous months.
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We extend this literature by jointly estimating the probability of
being delinquent with the intensity of delinquency measured by the
cumulative delinquency rate. We also estimate the impact of the
predicted probability' and predicted intensity of delinquency on the
probability of default and prepayment in the second step of the
estimation. This approach lets us observe and test for the dynamic and
non-linear nature of mortgage behavior.5

II. Econometric Model
A mortgage's status is the result of joint decisions by the
borrower and the lender. The current status—prepaid, defaulted, or
continuing—is influenced by the cumulative payment history. Because
a mortgage's current outcome is not independent of the previous
monthly outcomes, we use a Heckman two-step procedure to control
for the endogeneity. We specifically focus on the impact of past
delinquency on the current outcome.
In the first step, we estimate the intensity of delinquency,
defined as the fraction oi the observed life of the loan that it is
delinquent. In the second step, we estimate a seemingly unrelated
bivariate probit model of mortgage outcomes and include the predicted
intensity of delinquency and predicted delinquency probability from the
first step.
In the first step of our model, we estimate a double-hurdle Tobit
model (Cragg's model) of the intensity' of delinquency because the
majority of mortgages have zero incidence of delinquency. The doublehurdle Tobit model separately models the probability of experiencing a
delinquency and the intensity. Specifically, let the first hurdle be
represented as

(1)
where

is an unobserved measure of the propensity of a mortgage i

to be delinquent, zi is a vector of borrower and loan characteristics, α
is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and

εi~N(0,1). Define a

dummy variable, di, as:
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(2)
The second hurdle is given by
(3)
where yi is the fraction of the observed life of mortgage i that is
delinquent or the intensity of delinquency, xi is a vector of borrower
and loan characteristics, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated,
and ui~N(0,σ2).
It is important to note that

ε and u are assumed independent.

By this we mean that unobserved factors that cause a mortgage to be
potentially delinquent are uncorrelated with the unobserved factors
that determine the fraction of the observed life that the mortgage is
actually delinquent.
The log-likelihood function is given by:
(4)
where Σ0 denotes the summation over observations with zero
delinquency, Φ denotes the standard normal distribution function, Σ+
denotes the summation over observations with a positive delinquency
rate, and Φ denotes the standard normal density function. The loglikelihood function is maximized by choosing the unknown parameters
α, β, and σ.
The predicted value of intensity can be calculated using the
estimated parameters α̂, β̂, and σ̂. The predicted value is given by:

(5)
where

(6)
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Intuitively, ̂γ equals the probability of delinquency multiplied by
the expected value of the delinquency ratio, conditional on a
delinquency rate greater than zero.
The second stage of the estimation uses the predicted value of
the intensity of delinquency in a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit
model of the mortgage outcome. Specifically, we jointly model the
probability of default and the probability of prepayment of a
mortgage.6
The model specification is given by

(7)
and

(8)
Equation (7) models the probability of default and prepayment of
mortgage
and
, respectively) as a function of loan and
borrower characteristics, wi, including the predicted intensity of
delinquency, and unknown parameters δ. The error terms εi have a
correlation coefficient equal to ρ.
The log-likelihood function for the seemingly unrelated bivariate
probit is given by:

(9)
where Φ2 denotes the standard bivariate normal cumulative density
function. The function is maximized by choosing the parameters δd, δd,
and ρ.7
Following Murphy and Topel [1985], we correct the variancecovariance matrix of the bivariate probit model to account for the
inclusion of estimated variables as regressors. We follow a procedure
outlined in Hardin [2002] to accomplish the correction using the
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statistical package STATA. The standard errors exhibit very little
change as a result of the correction.8

III. Data
We draw our sample of loans for the estimation from a dataset
consisting of the performance history of the underlying collateral of
pools of private-label subprime securitizations available from
Loanperformance (LP). Only 30-year fixed-rate loans for home
purchase in metropolitan areas are included. The LP database provides
information on the loan at origination, including property location, LTV,
credit score (FICO), and documentation and prepayment penalty
status. The database also includes pool-level information on the
provider of the data to LP, as well as monthly information on the age
and the status of the loan (current, defaulted, prepaid, or delinquent).
A cross-section of 22,799 loans from January 1996 through May
2003 is selected from the LP database. For each loan, we randomly
pick one month in the performance history and compute the intensity
of delinquency to that point. This is the fraction of the observed life of
the loan that is delinquent. For example, 0 indicates that the loan has
never been delinquent, 0.5 indicates that the loan has been delinquent
one-half of the time, and 1 indicates that the loan has always been
delinquent.
External data from a number of sources are matched to the
sample. We use the metropolitan area repeat sales House Price Index
from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight and the
balance of the loan to calculate a current loan-to-value ratio. We
match the contemporaneous metropolitan area unemployment rate
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to the loan. We also compute the
change in the prevailing prime interest rate from the date of loan
origination to the current date using Freddie Mac's Primary Mortgage
Market Survey as a measure of the change in interest rates affecting
the refinancing incentive.
A more detailed description of the variables used in the
estimation is in Exhibit 2. Exhibit 3 provides summary statistics for the
data.
Identification is achieved in the model using a theory-based
specification approach. The double-hurdle model and the bivariate
probit model include a common set of covariates such as age of the
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loan and FICO that are chosen on the basis of their theoretical
relationship.
One variable, a low documentation binary, is included in the
double-hurdle model of cumulative delinquency but not in the bivariate
model of default and pre-payment. Low documentation loans are
typically used by borrowers with lumpy income streams such as small
business owners. Because of the uneven income streams of these
borrowers, we would expect to see higher rates of missed payments,
but we would not expect to see differing levels of loan termination
based on uneven income streams.
Two variables, the change in interest rates and a prepayment
penalty binary, are included in the bivariate probit model only.9
Interest rate changes are theorized to affect prepayments through the
refinance incentive and to affect defaults through the option theory of
mortgages.9

IV. Results
Exhibit 4 presents the results of the first step of the estimation,
the double-hurdle Tobit model. The first column reports the results
from estimation of the first hurdle [the α vector in Equation (1)], the
probability of delinquency, and the second column reports the results
from estimation of the second hurdle [the β vector in Equation (3)],
the intensity of delinquency. Exhibit 5 reports the results of the second
step of the estimation, the seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model
[the δd and δp vectors in Equation (7)].
Because many of the independent variables enter into both the
first and the second stages of the estimation, interpretation of the
coefficients is not straightforward. For instance, FICO affects the
predicted cumulative delinquency frequency by affecting the
probability of delinquency as well the level of delinquency, conditional
on being delinquent. The predicted intensity of delinquency and the
predicted probability of delinquency then affect the probability of
default and the probability of prepayment in the seemingly unrelated
bivariate probit model.
In the second step, then, FICO has an indirect effect on the
probability of default and prepayment through its impact on predicted
delinquency probability- and intensity of delinquency, and a direct
effect through inclusion of a FICO variable.
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Exhibit 6 graphs this relationship and the way FICO ultimately
affects default and prepayment probabilities. To interpret the
coefficients, we graph the estimated probability of default and
prepayment over the range of observed values for each of the
continuous independent variables, holding all other variables at their
means. For the discrete independent variables, we calculate the
percentage change in the estimated probabilities as the variable
moves from 0 to 1.
The past delinquency behavior of a loan is strongly positively
related to the probability of default and prepayment, as shown in
Exhibit 7. This is the direct effect oi the intensity' of delinquency, and
does not incorporate the indirect effects of variables that caused the
delinquency to change in the first place.
As one would expect, as a loan increases in the intensity of
delinquency, there is a higher probability that the loan defaults. There
is a peak in defaults at 6.3% when the intensity is 0.72 and a slight
decline thereafter.
Somewhat surprising is the strength of the impact of past
delinquency behavior on prepayments. At an intensity of delinquency
of 0.72, the probability of prepayment is 26.3%. This is a strong
indicator of distressed prepayments.
One important finding is that delinquency in the subprime
market tends to lead to prepayments more than defaults. Prepayments
increase more quickly than defaults as the intensity of delinquency
increases. The odds ratios for default and prepayment are 3.82 for
default and 5.89 for prepayment as the intensity of delinquency
increases from 2% to 72%.
As a result, while prepayments are almost always more likely,
they are even more prevalent when a loan has been delinquent most
of its observed life. Prepayments are 2.93 times more likely when we
should see very few defaults (intensity of delinquency = 0.02), and
prepayments are 4.16 times more likely when distressed prepayments
are very likely (intensity of delinquency = 0.72). These results provide
evidence that distressed prepayments rise rapidly, and even more
than defaults, in response to extended periods of delinquency.
Exhibits 8A and 8B reflect the marginal effects of LTV at
origination and current LTV on our first- and second-stage estimates.
The two graphs are practically mirror images. While the origination
LTV results reflect the impact of subprime underwriting requirements
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that higher LTV loans must have compensating factors, the marginal
effects of current LTV support the ruthless default theory of borrower
behavior.
As current LTV crosses the threshold of 100, the probability of
default increases exponentially. At an LTV of 100, the probability' of
default is 6.8%, rising to 25.9% as LTV climbs to 120. When current
LTV is in excess of 100, the value of the property is less than the
mortgage outstanding, leading to a ruthless default on the mortgage in
an option-theoretic framework.10
We also find that prepayments are negatively related to the
current LTV. This is consistent with the limited options of a borrower in
a severe negative equity option.
Further evidence of distressed prepayments appears in Exhibits
9A and 9B. Delinquent borrowers with positive equity in their property,
evidenced by low current LTV, prepay with greater probability than
delinquent borrowers without equity. This appears to be a rational
response for borrowers who are weighing selling their property and
preserving equity compared to borrowers without equity to protect.
Delinquent borrowers with positive equity rarely default, while
delinquent borrowers without equity default at much higher
probabilities. This suggests that, although lenders have incentives to
foreclose on properties with positive equity, borrowers are prepaying
in advance of that possibility.11
Credit scores play an important role in determining the
probabilities of prepayment and default both directly and indirectly.
Exhibit 10 shows the effects of FICO on the probability of delinquency
and the intensity of delinquency Borrowers with low credit scores are
delinquent with a 25% probability, and these loans are predicted to be
delinquent nearly 20% of their lifetime. Borrowers with credit scores of
750, however, are delinquent with a 3% probability, and their loans
will spend just 0.65% of their lives in delinquency.
The combined indirect and direct impact of FICO on default and
prepayment is shown in Exhibit 11. At levels of FICO below 570, the
probability of default is greater than the probability of prepayment. As
expected, defaults decline with FICO, indicating that performance with
regard to past financial obligations is a good predictor of current
performance. We also find that prepayments increase with credit
score. This may be an indication that borrowers with high credit scores
are able to cure into prime mortgages.
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Exhibit 1 2 reflects the percentage change in our four estimates
of interest as each of the continuous independent variables are
increased by one standard deviation, holding all other variables at
their means. The impacts on the probability' of delinquency, the
intensity of delinquency, the probability of default, and the probability
of prepayment are shown.
Rising credit scores reduce the probability of delinquency and
the intensity of delinquency. An increase in FICO by one standard
deviation cuts the probability of default by nearly one-half, while the
probability of prepayment increases by nearly one-quarter.
As would be expected, the probability of prepayment is
negatively related to changes in interest rates over the life of the loan.
Exhibit 13 reports this evidence. Prepayment and (to a lesser extent)
default probabilities decline as interest rates rise. This is consistent
with the refinancing incentive for prepayment.
The area unemployment rate, included as a proxy for trigger
events, has very little impact on our estimated variables. Rising
unemployment rates would be theorized to increase delinquency and
default probabilities as they potentially increase the financial distress
of these borrowers, but we do not find this relationship using the
previous month’s metropolitan area unemployment rate as an
indication of trigger events.
Exhibit 14 shows the percentage change in the discrete
independent variables as the variable switches from 0 to 1. The first
row reflects the impact of low documentation (LD) on a loan's
performance. Low doc increases the probability of delinquency and the
intensity of delinquency, but slightly reduces the probabilities of
default and prepayment.
The second row shows the impact of prepayment penalties. The
presence of a prepayment penalty reduces the probability of
prepayment by one-half.
The next series of variables in Exhibit 14 represent the fixed
effects of MIC_group. MIC_group is a variable in the pool-level
Loanperformance data indicating the source of the data (the data
provider). Data providers include lenders and servicers in the subprime
market. The coefficients can therefore reflect many different sources of
heterogeneity in the subprime market derived from origination,
underwriting of the pools of loans, owners of the securities, and
servicing.
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The results are significant and substantial in all the estimates.
Tests of interaction of the MIC_group with delinquency and credit
scores proved to be untruthful.

V. Conclusion
The emergence of subprime lending has created many
challenges in the marketplace. With the high, and sometimes
unexpectedly high, termination rates of subprime loans, one challenge
is to come to a more complete understanding of how mortgages
terminate. For example, are there paths to termination that indicate
whether a loan will ultimately default or prepay?
The evidence is that the long-run delinquency of a loan leads to
elevated probabilities of prepayment and default, with a more
pronounced response in terms of prepayment. These prepayments are
made when a loan is delinquent and are independent of interest rates;
as a consequence, we interpret these types of prepayments as
distressed prepayments. These results cannot be consistent with credit
curing refinances {improving a credit history through time), because
delinquency worsens not improves credit history. Our results therefore
provide an alternative interpretation for the observed high rate of outof-the-money prepayments of subprime loans, which is consistent with
further credit deterioration.
Finally, the relationship between the extent or intensity of
delinquency and default is non-linear. In fact, if a loan spends most of
its life in delinquency, this actually implies a lower probability of
default. These results are consistent with motivations such as free
rent, income smoothing, and the value of delay.

Disclaimer
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy,
disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any
of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the
author's colleagues upon the staff of the Commission.
The views expressed in this research are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, and the Board
of Governors.
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Notes
1. We also examine loans that do not terminate to account for all
possible states.
2. Note that loans that arc in foreclosure proceedings have not fully
terminated. In fact, a portion of these loans can be reinstated,
prepaid, or modified (terms extended or other alterations made
to reduce monthly payments), or experience other alternative
outcomes. Researchers who examine these issues include
Weagley [1988], Lawrence and Arshadi [1995], Ambrose and
Capone [1996, 1998], Phillips and Rosenblatt [1997], Geppert
and Karels [2001], Wang, Young, and Zhou [2002], and
Lambrecht, Perraudin, and Satchell [2003].
3. In a short refinance, the lender forgives a portion of the debt and
allows the borrower to restructure the delinquent mortgage into
a new mortgage with a lower principal balance.
4. Industry reports have also examined the delinquency of mortgages.
For example, Gjaja and Wang [2004] examine transition
matrices of subprime loans for a single servicer.
5. Recall that default is defined as the beginning of foreclosure
proceedings.
6. The probability of the third possible outcome, a mortgage
continuing, equals one minus the probability of default minus
the probability of prepayment.
7. As indicated in Greene [2000], multivariate probit allows the error
terms to be correlated and thus relaxes the independence
assumption of the multinomial logit. The assumption of a normal
error term instead of logistic is also consistent with the firststage error assumptions. In addition, in a J-dimensional problem
J-1 probabilities must be considered. Therefore, in our case,
with a three-dimensional problem, two probabilities must be
considered.
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8. In calculating cross-partial matrices:

and

where θ1 and θ1 are vectors of all estimated parameters, we
account for the inclusion of the predicted intensity of
delinquency variable, Dq, only.
9. The prepayment penalty indicator variable is included in the prepay
specification only.
10. The impact of an increase in current LTV by one standard deviation
elasticity on the probability of default is 316%. See Exhibit 5.
11. Lenders also can allow short sales (sales price < outstanding
balance) to avoid the costs of foreclosure.

References
Alexander, W, S.D. Grimshaw, G.R. McQuen, and B.A. Slade. "Some Loans
are More Equal than Others: Third-Party Originations and Defaults in
the Subprime Mortgage Industry" Real Estate Economics, 30 (2002).
pp, 667-697.
Ambrose, B., R. Buttimer, and C. Capone. “Pricing Mortgage Default and
Foreclosure Delay.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 29 (1997).
pp. 314-325.
Ambrose, B., and C. Capone. "Cost-Benefit Analysis of Single-Family
Foreclosure Alternatives." Journal of Real Estate Finance and
Economics, 13 (1996). pp. 105-120.
_____. "The Hazard Rates of First and Second Defaults." Journal of Real
Estate Finance and Economics, 20 (2000), pp. 275-293.
_____. “Modeling the Conditional Probability of Foreclosure in the Context of
Single-Family Mortgage Default Resolutions.” Real Estate Economics.
26 (1998). pp. 391-429.
Baku, E., and M. Smith. “Loan Delinquency in the Community Lending
Organizations; Case Studies of NeighborWorks Organizations.” Housing
Policy Debate, 9 (1998), pp. 151-175.
Journal of Fixed Income, Vol. 15, No. 1 (June 2005): pg. 28-39. DOI. This article is © Institutional Investor, Inc. and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Institutional Investor, Inc. does not
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission
from Institutional Investor, Inc.

15

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Calem. P., K. Gillen, and S. Wachter. “The Neighborhood Distribution of
Subprime Mortgage Lending.” Journal of Real Estate Finance and
Economics, 29 (2004), pp. 393-410.
Calem, P., and S. Wachter. "Community Reinvestment and Credit Risk:
Evidence from Affordable-Home-Loan Programs.” Real Estate
Economics, 27 (1999). pp. 105-134.
Capozza, D., and T Thomson. “Optimal Stopping and Losses on Subprime
Mortgages.” Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 30 (2005).
Chinloy. P. "Privatized Default Risk and Real Estate Recessions: The U.K.
Mortgage Market." Real Estate Economics, 23 (1995), pp. 410-420.
Courchane, M., B. Surette, and P. Zorn. "Subprime Borrowers: Mortgage
Transitions and Outcomes." Journal of Real Estate Finance and
Economics, 29 (2004), pp. 365-392.
Cowan. A., and C. Cowan. “Default Correlation: An Empirical Investigation of
a Subprime Lender.” Journal of Banking and Finance, 28 (2004). pp.
753-771.
Geppert, J., and G. Karels. “Mutually Beneficial Loan Workouts.” Journal of
Economics and Finance, 16 (2001), pp. 103-118.
Getter, D. "Contributing to the Delinquency of Borrowers." The Journal of
Consumer Affairs, 37 (2003), pp. 86-100.
Greene, W.H. Econometric Analysis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Inc., 2000.
Gjaja, I., and J. Wang. “Delinquency Transitions in Subprime Loans-Analysis,
Model, Implications.” Citigroup, United States Fixed Income Research,
Asset-Backed Securities, March 17, 2004.
Hardin, J. “The Robust Variance Estimator for Two-Stage Models.” The Stata
Journal, 2 (2002), pp. 253-266.
Kau, J., and T. Kim. "Waiting to Default: The Value of Delay." Journal of the
American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association. 22 (1994),
pp. 539-551.
Lambrecht, B., W. Perraudin, and S. Satchell. "Mortgage Default and
Possession Under Recourse: A Competing Hazards Approach." Journal
of Money, Credit, and Banking, 35 (2003), pp. 425-442.
Lawrence, E., and N. Arshadi. "A Multinomial Logit Analysis of Problem Loan
Resolution Choices in Banking." Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking,
27 (1995), pp. 202-216.
Morton, T. “A Discriminant Function Analysis of Residential Mortgage
Delinquency and Foreclosure.” American Real Estate and Urban
Economics Association, 3 (1975), pp. 73-90.
Murphy. K.. and R. Topel. “Estimation and Inference in Two-Step Econometric
Models.” Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 3 (1985), pp. 8897.

Journal of Fixed Income, Vol. 15, No. 1 (June 2005): pg. 28-39. DOI. This article is © Institutional Investor, Inc. and
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Institutional Investor, Inc. does not
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission
from Institutional Investor, Inc.

16

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Pennington-Cross, A. “Credit History and the Performance of Prime and
Nonprime Mortgages.” Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics,
27 (2003), pp. 279-301.
_____. “Subprime Lending in the Primary and Secondary Markets.” Journal of
Housing Research. 13 (2002), pp. 31-50.
Phillips, R., and E. Rosenblatt. "The Legal Environment and the Choice of
Default Resolution Alternatives: An Empirical Analysis.” Journal of Real
Estate Research. 13 (1997). pp. 145-154.
von Furstenberg, G., and R. Green. "Estimation of Delinquency Risk for Home
Mortgage Portfolios." American Real Estate and Urban Economics
Association. 2 (1974), pp. 5-19.
Wang, K., L. Young, and Y. Zhou. "Nondiscriminating Foreclosure and
Voluntary Liquidating Costs." The Review of Financial Studies. 15
(2002). pp. 959-985.
Weagley, R. "Consumer Default of Delinquent Adjustable-Rate Mortgage
Loans." The Journal of Consumer Affairs, 22 (1988), pp. 38-54.

Appendix
Exhibit 1: Dynamic Role of Delinquency
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Exhibit 2: Description of Variables and Source
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Exhibit 3: Summary Statistics for Estimation Data Set

Dq is the intensity of delinquency. Dp indicates when the loan is delinquent. d indicates
the loan has defaulted. p indicates the loan has prepaid. A is age. L is the origination
loan-to-value ratio. Lc is the current loan-to-value ratio. F is the FICO score. U is last
month’s unemployment rate. LD is a low or no documentation loan. ΔI is the
cumulative change in interest rates since origination. P is the prepay penalty if in force
for the current month. The other variables are dummy variables for each data
provider.
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Exhibit 4: Double-Hurdle Results

All variables are transformed so that the mean is zero and the standard deviation is 1.
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Exhibit 5: Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit Results

All variables, including the dummy variables, are transformed so that the mean is zero
and the standard deviation is 1. The excluded data provider is the Residential Funding
Corporation, which includes both RFC Home Equity and RFC Master.
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Exhibit 6: Direct and Indirect Effects of FICO on Default and
Prepayment Probabilities

Exhibit 7: Effect of Predicted Intensity of Delinquency on Termination
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Exhibit 8A: Effect of LTV at Origination on First- and Second-Stage
Estimates

Exhibit 8B: Effect of Current LTV on First- and Second-Stage
Estimates
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Exhibit 9A: Predicted Probability of Prepayment for Various Current
Equity Positions and Intensity of Delinquency

Exhibit 9B: Predicted Probability of Default for Various Current Equity
Positions and Intensity of Delinquency

* Direct effect only. Low and high are defined as a one standard deviation above and
below the mean.
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Exhibit 10: Effect of FICO on Delinquency

Exhibit 11: Effect of FICO on Termination
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Exhibit 12: One Standard Deviation Elasticity

Exhibit 13: Effect of Change in Interest Rates on Termination
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Exhibit 14: Fixed and Discontinuous Effects—Percent Change
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